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nial of the Building Industry's administrative challenge. The trial
court held that the Building Industry failed to meet its burden establishing that the State Water Board abused its discretion in approving
the permit, or that the permit requirements were "impracticable under
federal law or unreasonable under state law." The Building Industry
appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District.
In reviewing the trial court's legal determinations, the court conducted a de novo review. The court acknowledged that the statutory
language of section 1342(p) (3) (B) (iii) of the CWA was susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation. The court looked to the
legislative history, public policy, and administrative construction of the
section to determine its meaning. The court held that the language in
section 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) allowed the EPA, or an approved state
agency permitted to issue NPDES permits, to impose appropriate water
pollution controls in addition to those that come within the definition
of "maximum extent practicable." The court found that Congress did
not intend to bar the EPA or state agency from imposing a more stringent water quality standard if the agency, based on its expertise and
technical factual information, and after the required administrative
hearing procedure, found this standard to be a necessary and workable
enforcement mechanism to achieving the goals of the CWA. Therefore, the court found the NPDES permit did not violate federal law and
the water boards had the authority to include a permit provision requiring compliance with the more stringent state water quality standards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the superior court's decision.
James E. Downing
Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 124 Cal.
App. 4th 245 (2004) (holding permits for appropriation of water that
did not specify actual uses, amounts, or places of use were speculative
and insufficient to satisfy requirements of the California Constitution,
the California Water Code, and the California Environmental Quality
Act).
Central Delta Water Agency, CCRC Farms, LLC, Plan Tract Farms,
the County of San Joaquin, San Joaquin County Flood Control and
Water Conservation District, and several Reclamation Districts (collectively "districts") challenged permits issued by the State Water Resources Control Board ("Board") for a wetlands project to divert water
into reservoirs that would be constructed on two islands for later rediversion and sale to potential purchasers. In issuing the permits, the
Board did not require the proponents of the project, Delta Wetlands
Properties ("DW"), to specify amounts, nature of, impacts of, or beneficial use of water sold. As such, the permits defined beneficial use
generally to include "domestic, irrigation, municipal, industrial, and
fish and wildlife" uses, but did not include environmental conse-

Issue 2

COURTREPORTS

quences. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, California, held
the permits were valid and the districts appealed to the Court of Appeal of California, Third Appellate District.
The court first addressed on review whether the Board violated the
California Constitution and the California Water Code by failing to
evaluate the uses to which the appropriated water would be put before
issuing the permits. The Constitution and Water Code both required
the Board to formulate the reasonable amount of water available for
beneficial use and to state that amount in definite terms. The court
found DW's permit applications failed to set forth the specific amount
of water, the place the water would be used, the use of the impounded
water, and that the intended use would be beneficial. As such, the
Board was unable to determine the actual or intended uses of the proposed water appropriation. The court thus found the Board's general
statement of potential beneficial use was speculative and insufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and Water Code.
The court next addressed whether DW could divert water from
DW's appropriated reservoirs to a would-be purchaser. As a condition
to issuing DW's permit, the Board required DW to demonstrate that
DW could reliably "wheel" water for the project. DW had not contracted to provide water to a specific customer, nor had DW contracted
with a conveyance facility to provide delivery to a customer. As such,
the court concluded the Board could not determine that DW could
reliably wheel water until DW demonstrated that DW had contracted to
provide water to a specific customer and obtained approval for the
necessary conveyance facilities.
Finally, the court assessed whether the Board violated the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") by failing to evaluate the environmental impacts of the delivery of water to actual purchasers.
CEQA required a public agency to prepare an Environmental Impact
Report ("EIR") to determine whether a proposed project would have a
significant impact on the environment. The agency must assimilate
EIR findings into conditions placed on the permits to mitigate environmental consequences of the intended beneficial use of the impounded water prior to issuance of a permit. The Board's final FIR
stated the site-specific analysis was speculative because the area of delivery and end uses of the project water were unknown.
The court ordered the trial court to set aside the permits and directed the Board to require DW to amend its permit applications to
specify an actual use and the amounts of the proposed water appropriation consistent with the requirements of the California Constitution and California Water Code. Additionally, the court ordered the
Board to evaluate the specified uses to determine whether the uses
were beneficial and whether the amounts were wheelable. Lastly, the
court reversed the CEQA determination and required the Board to
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conduct an environmental analysis once DW specified the end users in
the amended permits.
The court thus reversed the trial court's validation of DW's permit.
Michael Graetz
City of Brentwood v. Cent. Valley Regional Water Quality Control Bd.,
123 Cal. App. 4th 714 (2004) (holding a party discharging pollutants
bore the burden of proving the exceptions in the California Water
Code relieved the party of liability for mandatory minimum penalties).
The City of Brentwood ("City") appealed the Alameda County Superior Court's decision to uphold the Central Valley Regional Water
Control Board's ("Board") imposition of $243,000 in mandatory
minimum penalties for violations of the City's wastewater discharge
permit. The City operated a wastewater treatment plant that discharged treated wastewater into Marsh Creek. In June 2000, the Board
issued the City a wastewater discharge permit mandating the concentration of dissolved oxygen in the plant's discharge not fall below 5.5
milligrams per liter. The permit required the City to monitor the dissolved oxygen level of its discharge daily and make monthly reports to
the Board.
The monitoring requirements went into effect inJuly 2001, and the
oxygen levels consistently fell below the proscribed minimums through
September. The City installed blower equipment to boost the oxygen
levels of the discharge. Following the installation, dissolved oxygen
levels returned to acceptable levels. However, oxygen levels fell periodically below the proscribed minimum due to equipment failures.
In June 2001 the Board issued a complaint charging the City with
eighty-one violations of the effluent limitation. Each violation carried
a $3000 penalty pursuant to the California Water Code ("Code"). The
Code stated that mandatory minimum penalties be assessed for each
violation where a party exceeded waste discharge limitations four or
more times in any period of six consecutive months. The Code enumerated exceptions for natural disasters or other occurrences of "exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character." The City asserted the
natural phenomenon exception applied because of a change in the
composition of the groundwater and the City could not otherwise explain the dissolved oxygen fluctuations. The City did not provide any
evidence to back this assertion, and further claimed the Board had the
burden of disproving the exception applied. The Board took the position that no exceptional circumstances beyond the City's control existed and the burden was therefore on the City to prove otherwise.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of California considered whether
the exceptions to liability in the Code were elements of the offense or
affirmative defenses. If the exceptions were elements of the offense,
the burden of proof would be on the Board. If the exceptions were

